

## Message Text

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TO USMISSION GENEVA

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SUBJECT: CCD OPENING SPEECH

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CLEARED US STATEMENT FOR CCD MEET-  
ING MARCH 4:

1. WE ARE RESUMING OUR WORK IN THE COMMITTEE AT A TIME WHEN  
DISARMAMENT EFFORTS ARE RECEIVING INCREASING ATTENTION IN  
THE SEARCH FOR A MORE STABLE AND SECURE WORLD. EVIDENCE OF  
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GROWING INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL SOLUTIONS TO NATIONAL  
SECURITY PROBLEMS CAN BE FOUND IN THE EXTENSIVE TREATMENT OF  
DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS AT THE 29TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT  
IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER OF INTER-

NATIONAL MEETINGS DEALING WITH THE SUBJECT.

2. HERE IN GENEVA, SOVIET AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS ARE WORKING OUT THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A SECOND-STAGE SALT AGREEMENT, THE BROAD OUTLINES OF WHICH WERE AGREED AT THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT. IN MOSCOW, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE ENGAGED IN DISCUSSIONS AIMED AT REACHING THE AGREEMENT GOVERNING PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS THAT IS CALLED FOR IN ARTICLE III OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY. IN WASHINGTON, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF RESTRAINT ON ENVIRONMENTAL -

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MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES. IN VIENNA, MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT ARE CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE IAEA IS THE FOCAL POINT FOR INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AS WELL AS OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. TWO MONTHS FROM NOW THE CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WILL BEGIN IN GENEVA.

3. THE CCD OCCUPIES A UNIQUE AND IMPORTANT POSITION IN THIS OVERALL EFFORT. OUR NEWLY ENLARGED COMMITTEE CAN EXPECT A HEAVIER WORKLOAD IN 1975 THAN IT HAS HAD IN SEVERAL YEARS. THE 29TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN ADDITION TO URGING THE CCD TO CONTINUE ITS WORK ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS LIMITATIONS, CALLED ON THE COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE QUESTIONS THAT HAVE SO FAR RECEIVED RELATIVELY LITTLE ATTENTION HERE -- NAMELY, ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION FOR MILITARY PURPOSES, NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONES, AND THE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. MY DELEGATION WELCOMES THESE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES AND IS CONFIDENT THAT THE CCD CAN MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION IN EACH OF THESE FIELDS.

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4. AMONG THE LARGE NUMBER OF ITEMS ON THE INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AGENDA, THE MOST PRESSING, IN OUR VIEW, CONCERN NON-PROLIFERATION AND RELATED NUCLEAR ISSUES. AN ENCOURAGING SIGN AT THE 29TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS THE RECOGNITION BY MANY DELEGATIONS THAT THERE IS SERIOUS CAUSE FOR CONCERN IN THE PROSPECT OF THE FURTHER SPREAD OF INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITIES. ANOTHER CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT WAS THE WIDE SUPPORT GIVEN TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE MANY CALLS FOR BROADER ADHERENCE TO THAT TREATY.

5. AT THE SAME TIME, A LARGE NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS RECOG-

NIZED THAT THE PREVENTION OF THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED, AND THAT A BROAD AND DETERMINED INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. MY GOVERNMENT IS URGENTLY CONSIDERING WHAT COURSES OF ACTION WOULD CONTRIBUTE MOST EFFECTIVELY TO ACHIEVING A MORE UNIVERSAL, RELIABLE SYSTEM OF SAFEGUARDS AGAINST DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY TO MILITARY PURPOSES AND TO INCREASING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO FOREGO THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPTION. MY GOVERNMENT LOOKS TO THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE TO ASSESS HOW WELL THE TREATY HAS FUNCTIONED IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF ITS EXISTENCE, TO CONSIDER HOW THE TREATY CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED,

AND TO PROVIDE AN IMPETUS FOR THE BROADLY-BASED EFFORT THAT WILL BE ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO AVOID A PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR POWERS.

6. THE REVIEW CONFERENCE WILL BE CONCERNED NOT ONLY WITH THE OPERATION OF THOSE PROVISIONS OF THE NPT THAT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES, BUT ALSO WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE PROVISIONS, NOTABLY ARTICLE VI, THAT WERE DESIGNED TO HALT AND REVERSE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT, SINCE THIS COMMITTEE LAST MET, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TOOK ANOTHER MAJOR STEP TO CURB THEIR COMPETITION IN NUCLEAR ARMS. AT VLADIVOSTOK, PRESIDENT FORD AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV SET FIRM AND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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EQUAL NUMERICAL LIMITS ON THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF BOTH SIDES. SPECIFICALLY, THEY AGREED TO PUT A CEILING OF 2400 ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND HEAVY BOMBERS FOR EACH COUNTRY. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR MISSILES THAT COULD BE ARMED WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED REENTRY VEHICLES WOULD BE 1320. BY AGREEING TO PLACE ALL THESE STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES UNDER THE CEILING AND TO SET AN ADDITIONAL LIMIT ON MIRVS, THIS GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW SALT ACCORD GOES WELL BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT CONCLUDED IN 1972.

7. BECAUSE OF THIS BREAKTHROUGH AT VLADIVOSTOK, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE NUCLEAR AGE EACH SIDE'S STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS AND FORCE PLANNING WILL NOT BE DRIVEN BY FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT A POSSIBLE OPEN-ENDED STRATEGIC BUILDUP BY THE OTHER SIDE BUT WILL INSTEAD BE BASED WITH CONFIDENCE ON THE FIRM PARAMETERS THAT WERE ESTABLISHED. THIS CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP. OF PERHAPS

GREATER LONG-RANGE IMPORTANCE, THE CEILINGS WORKED OUT BY THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL PROVIDE A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR NEGOTIATING FUTURE ARMS REDUCTIONS. WHILE MANY DETAILS REMAIN TO BE SETTLED BEFORE THIS GENERAL FRAMEWORK CAN BE TRANSFORMED INTO A NEW AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES IS CONFIDENT THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT CAN BE CONCLUDED THIS YEAR AND THAT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCING THE FORCE CEILINGS CAN FOLLOW SOON THEREAFTER.

8. MY GOVERNMENT IS AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE ATTACHED INTERNATIONALLY TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AS A MEANS OF CURBING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO SEEKING AN ADEQUATELY-VERIFIED CTB. THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY, NEGOTIATED IN MOSCOW LAST

SUMMER, IS NOT ONLY A STEP TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE, BUT WILL BE, IN ITSELF, A SIGNIFICANT CONSTRAINT ON THE NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION BETWEEN THE US AND USSR.

9. THE QUESTION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS HAS RECENT-LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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LY BECOME A MAJOR TOPIC IN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS. RECOGNIZING THAT A NUMBER OF UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY AND PRACTICABILITY OF PNES HAVE YET TO BE RESOLVED AND THAT THE USE OF PNES IS A HIGHLY COMPLICATED MATTER BOTH POLITICALLY AND LEGALLY, THE US DELEGATION AT THE RECENT UNGA CALLED FOR THOROUGH INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE PNE QUESTION. WE ACCORDINGLY SUPPORTED THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S REQUEST, IN RESOLUTION 3261 D, THAT THE CCD CONSIDER THE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS.

10. THE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF PNES HAVE TWO ASPECTS: THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES AMONG NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES.

11. WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST OF THESE CATEGORIES, IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS CARRIED OUT OSTENSIBLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES ARE NOT USED TO GAIN WEAPONS-RELATED INFORMATION IN CIRCUMVENTION OF AGREED LIMITATIONS ON WEAPONS TESTING. THIS IS THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY IN MOSCOW, WHERE THE TWO SIDES ARE DISCUSSING CRITERIA TO ENSURE THAT PNES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY. AN ANALOGOUS QUESTION ARISES WITH RESPECT TO ANY FORM OF INTERNATIONAL TEST BAN AGREEMENT, AND THIS QUESTION WOULD BE PARTICULARLY CRUCIAL WITH A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN -- SINCE, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AUTHORIZED

WEAPONS TESTING, THERE WOULD BE A GREATER INCENTIVE TO SEEK WEAPONS INFORMATION IN THE COURSE OF A PNE PROGRAM.

12. WITH RESPECT TO PNE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES, MY GOVERNMENT'S FIRM CONVICTION, WHICH I WISH AGAIN TO RECALL TO THIS COMMITTEE, IS THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WITHOUT IN THE PROCESS ACQUIRING A DEVICE THAT COULD BE USED AS A NUCLEAR WEAPON. IT HAS BEEN ARGUED THAT THE CRITICAL FACTOR IS NOT THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR DEVICES BUT THE INTENTION OF THE COUNTRY PRODUCING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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THE DEVICE. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER WE CAN ACCEPT THE STATED INTENTIONS OF ANY COUNTRY, BUT WHETHER A WORLD IN WHICH MANY STATES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CARRY

OUT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS--AND IN WHICH ALL THEREFORE FEAR THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY OF OTHERS--WOULD NOT BE VASTLY LESS SECURE THAN A WORLD THAT HAS SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY.

13. A NOTABLE DEVELOPMENT AT THE LAST UNGA WAS THE HEIGHTENED INTEREST IN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES. RESOLUTIONS WERE ADOPTED DEALING WITH NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE PROPOSALS FOR SOUTH ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND AFRICA AS WELL AS WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY. REFLECTING THIS RENEWED INTEREST, AND MOTIVATED IN PART BY THE DIVERSITY OF THE REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND THE COMPLEXITY OF SOME OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REQUESTED THAT AN AD HOC GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS UNDER CCD AUSPICES UNDERTAKE A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.

14. MY DELEGATION WELCOMES THIS STUDY AND HOPES IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE WIDE RANGE OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ISSUES. WE THINK IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE EXPERTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ARRANGEMENTS THAT COULD BE APPLIED UNIVERSALLY, GIVEN THE VAST DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST FROM REGION TO REGION. ONE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY MIGHT BE TO IDENTIFY ISSUES WHERE STANDARDIZED NFZ PROVISIONS MIGHT BE FEASIBLE, AND OTHERS WHERE THEY WOULD NOT.

15. UNLIKE EARLIER STUDIES UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE STUDY OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES WILL INVOLVE ISSUES THAT ARE PRIMARILY POLITICAL, RATHER THAN TECHNICAL, IN NATURE. THIS IS THE FIRST STUDY TO BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE CCD, AND IT WAS ENTRUSTED TO THE CCD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT A

NUMBER OF STATES NOT REPRESENTED IN THE COMMITTEE WOULD PARTICIPATE. MY DELEGATION HAS DEVELOPED A NUMBER OF IDEAS ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS PROJECT AND WILL BE DISCUSSING THESE IDEAS WITH MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE IN THE NEXT FEW LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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DAYS.

16. IN THE AREA OF RESTRAINTS ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, I AM PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO REPORT TWO IMPORTANT ACTIONS RECENTLY TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. ON JANUARY 22, PRESIDENT FORD SIGNED THE US INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925. I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT, ALTHOUGH NOT PARTY TO THE PROTOCOL IN THE PAST, MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS OBSERVED ITS PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES.

17. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SIGNED ON JANUARY 22 THE US INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, A PRODUCT OF THE EXPERT AND PAINSTAKING EFFORTS OF THIS COMMITTEE. AS MEMBERS OF THE CCD ARE AWARE, THIS CONVENTION IS THE FIRST AGREEMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACTUAL ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPONS, NAMELY, BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND TOXINS. WITH RATIFICATION PROCEDURES ALREADY COMPLETED BY THE THREE DEPOSITARY GOVERNMENTS AND BY MANY MORE THAN THE REQUIRED 19 ADDITIONAL GOVERNMENTS, WE EXPECT THE CONVENTION TO ENTER INTO FORCE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS WILL PROMPT MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO ADHERE TO THE CONVENTION.

18. AS MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ARE AWARE, ARTICLE II OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIRES PARTIES TO DESTROY OR TO DIVERT TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE BUT NOT LATER THAN NINE MONTHS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, ALL AGENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND MEANS OF DELIVERY PROHIBITED IN ARTICLE I. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT THE ENTIRE US STOCKPILE OF BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN AGENTS AND WEAPONS HAS ALREADY BEEN DESTROYED, AND FORMER US BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FACILITIES HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO PEACEFUL USES. MY DELEGATION, AND I AM SURE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, WOULD WELCOME SIMILAR CONFIRMATIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE II FROM PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION.

19. THE RATIFICATION OF THE GENEVA PROTOCOL AND THE RATIFICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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CONVENTION ARE VIEWED BY MY GOVERNMENT AS SIGNIFICANT STEPS TOWARD OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF THE EFFECTIVE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. MY DELEGATION IS PREPARED AT THE CURRENT SESSION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ACTIVE EXAMINATION OF POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER EFFECTIVE RESTRAINTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS. AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THIS EXAMINATION SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE VERIFICATION QUESTION IN RELATION TO THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OF ANY PROHIBITION.

20. US INTEREST IN OVERCOMING THE DANGERS OF THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES WAS REFLECTED IN THE US-SOVIET SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT OF JULY 3, 1974, IN WHICH BOTH COUNTRIES ADVOCATED THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES POSSIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH THAT OBJECTIVE. AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST FALL, MY GOVERNMENT INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE READY AT THE CCD TO CONSIDER THIS SUBJECT FURTHER. WE POINTED OUT THAT LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF

ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION AND THAT MANY OF THE APPLICATIONS POSED FOR DISCUSSION ARE AT PRESENT HYPOTHETICAL. AT THE SAME TIME WE STRESSED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY AND POSITIVELY IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER. IN THAT SPIRIT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMITTEE'S DELIBERATIONS.

21. IN MY STATEMENT TODAY, I HAVE DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF NEW RESPONSIBILITIES ASSUMED BY THE COMMITTEE. THERE IS ANOTHER ISSUE I THINK SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE LIST: THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINTS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THIS COMMITTEE HAS ALWAYS GIVEN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. WHILE MY DELEGATION REGARDS THIS AS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE, WE SEE NO REASON WHY POSSIBLE CONTROLS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WHICH ACCOUNT FOR THE LARGEST SHARE OF WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED CONCURRENTLY. I PLAN TO RETURN TO THIS SUBJECT IN A LATER INTERVENTION. KISSINGER

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